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"A European View of U.S. Trade Feud:" 
U.S. Counterarguments 
The following points respond to arguments raised by EC Commissioner 
Peter Sutherland in his Wall street Journal article entitled, "A 
European View of U. s. Trade Feud." Sutherland's piece was 
prompted by the enlargement dispute between the United States and 
the European Community. He embellishes his arguments with 
~xamples intended to illustrate ·the EC's general free trade 
stance and specific liberalizing measures taken in the agriculture __ 
and steel sectors. 
U.S.-EC Enlargement Dispute 
EC JJ.rgulllent: 
we are "witnessing the collapse of rational debate." The 
u.s. is attempting to "appease protectionists in its own 
camp". or "looking for dramatic test cases in the hope of 
scoring~political points." It is counterproductive to 
"blame someone else for one's own failings." 
\ 
U.S. Response: 
The U.S. is not responsi~le for initiating this dispute. 
The recently announced U.S. actions are intended only to 
Ii • . •:.' 
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protect our trade rights·in the face of new EC restrictions 
on almost one billion dollars _in u.s. exports. 
The U.S. has tried to resolve the issues raised by EC 
enlargement through "rational debate." During the years 
preceding accession, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of 
Agriculture Block, USTR Brock and Secretary of Commerce 
Baldrige repeatedly asked EC Commissioners to discuss the 
provisions of the accession treaty, and the problems these 
provisions might raise, prior to its implementation. 
In Ambassador Yeutter's first meeting with EC Colllll\issioners 
De Clercq and Andriessen in December, he raised our .concerns 
regarding certain provisions of the accession treaty, and 
asked that the EC sit down and discuss its plans with us. 
Ambassador Yeutter raised this issue on two more occasions 
with Commissioner De Clercq in January and February of this 
year. 
Under GATT rules, the EC had an obligation to consult with 
;..,,:.- . 
us before implementing these measures. Nevertheless, the 
EC notified the GATT of its intended actions only 17 ·days 
before the new restrictions took effect. 
- U.S. officials have travelled to Brussels several times this 
spring in order to obtain more detailed information on the 
'. . .. 
3 
EC's new restrictions. Prior to taking any action ourselves, 
f 
we held high-level meetings with EC officials, and asked 
that the EC (1) suspend its quotas in order to allow the 
GATT time to decide whether they were legal, and (2) hold 
negotiations with us immediately to agree on appropriate 
compensation for increased tariffs on over $600 million in. 
U.S. corn and sorghum exports. The EC has thus far refused 
these requests. 
In light of the tremendous amount of U.S. exports at stake, 
and the EC's apparent unwillingness to resolve these issues 
in a timely fashion, we chose a measured response, designed 
to ensure that both sides have an equivalent incentive to 
resolve. this\'dispute quickly. 
EC Argument: 
. 
The "narrow" U. s • focus on losses in agricultural exports 
resulting from·the entry of Spain and Portugal into the EC 
fails to·~-take account of "overall gains" which u.s. exports 
will experience as a result of EC enlargement. 
\, 
U.S. Response: 
The EC's contention that U.S. exports of industrial products 
to Spain and Portugal will increase as a result of accession 
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is largely a hypothetical one. 
' 
First, reductions in industrial tariffs are scheduled to be 
phased in over seven years, while tariff increases on 
agricultural imports were fully implemented on March 1. 
Second, U.S. industrial exporters will face increased 
competition from EC suppliers in Spain and Portugal, since 
all tariffs between the EC and Spain anq. Portugal will be 
eliminated. 
Finally, previous experience does not support the EC's 
contention. Following Greece's entry into the EC in 1981, the 
U.S. share of total Greek impo~ts fell, while the EC's share 
.of total imports rose. 
U.S.-EC Trade Relations 
EC Argument: 
The EC is the world'~ largest free trader. The EC has 
reduced protectionism in Europe by qismantling sbch barriers 
to trade as tariffs, quotas, and state subsidies. 
U.S. Response: 
. . •. . . .. -
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The EC is indeed a large trader, though the EC accounts for 
30 percent ~f world trade only if trade among its members is 
included. If external trade comparisons are made, the EC's 
numbers are about the same as those of the U.S. 
For the EC to consider itself the world's largest free 
trader is a most dubious proposition. The Community is highly 
protectionist in a myriad of ways, and probably has more 
techniques and mechanisms to constrain imports than any 
political entity in the world. Many people believe that the 
EC has become increasingly protectionist in recent years as 
its economies have stagnated and as it has lost its inter-
national competitiveness in many products, especially in 
newer areas such as high technology. 
U.S. imports accounted for 62% of LDC exports of manufactured 
products to the industrial world in 1984, while the comparable 
share for the EC-was just 23%. 
While EC tariff levels are about the same as those in the 
U. s. , the EC often uses "grey area" and other' non-tariff 
measures which are not reported to the GATT. EC voluntary 
restraint agreements on consumer electronics, textiles and 
steel coming from Far Eastern countries significantly 
distort trade patterns, shifting these exports to U.S. mar-
'·. 
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kets. Other EC pra~tices which distort world trade include 
restructuring.subsidies, government procurement practices, 
and the Common Agricultural Policy {CAP). 
Industry 
A. Aircraft 
EC Argument: 
U.S. complaints about excessive state supports for aircraft 
are founded less on facts than on U.S. reluctance to accept 
international competition in a sector dominated by the U.S. 
U.S. Response: 
U.S._ complaints are based solely_ on our rights under the 
GATT Agreement on International Trade in c~vil Aircraft and 
the GATT Agre~~ent on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties. 
They have nothing to do with U.S. reluctance to accept 
~--~ 
international competition in trade in civil aircraft. 
As a matter of policy, we welcome such competition provided 
it is conducted on a fair basis in accordance with inter-
national agreements. We seriously question whether continued 
government support of Airbus Industrie is consistent with the 
- ' 
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provisions of these international agreements. Such state 
supports do not lead to fair competition; rather, they 
preempt the private marketplace. 
One of our major difficulties is that the European governments 
.have so far been unwilling to disclose the amount of their 
aircraft subsidies. For that reason, we have initiated a 
series of consultations with the European goverrunents in 
order to come to a joint understanding of what is proper 
governmental behavior in 1ight of the provisions of the 
international agreements. 
B. Steel 
.EC _Argument: 
The EC maintains that its steel industry has restructured 
while the u.s. industry has not. It claims to have eliminated 
more than 18 percent of its hot-rolling production capacity 
since 19.80, and 19 percent of its crude steel capacity. EC 
reduction in employment has been as high as 42 percent; 
representing 280,000 job losses. 
U.S. Response: 
8 
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While the Europeans·have reduced capacity significantly, much· 
excess capacity still remains. on the U.S. side, raw steel 
capacity now stands at 127 million net tons, down from 153.7 
million net tons in 1980, representing a reduction of 17 
percent. 
Operating costs in the U.S. steel industry have dropped 17 
percent since 1982. Employment costs have been reduced by 
35 percent. 
Employment in the U.S. steel industry fell from 325,100 
workers in 1982 to 237,000 workers in 1985. At the same 
time, the p:t:'qductivity of the U.S. steel worker increased by 
. .::·~·:;~-
over fifty percent between 1982 and 1985.· 
EC Argument: 
The EC claims_ that state subsidies linked to a restruc-
turing ~t,~n have been virtually eliminated and they consider 
::.... . ~ 
that the European industry can stand on its on two feet. 
' 
U.S. Response: 
While EC state subsidies have been virtually eliminated in a 
few countries (West Germany and the Netherlands), the impact 
9 
of these subsidies will continue to benefit the industry 
over the next decade. 
Subsidy levels remain significant in other EC countries 
(France, the UK, and Italy); Moreover, as many European 
steel companies are operating in the.red, it is likely.that 
they will continue to demand government support. 
EC Argument: 
The EC claims that U.S. competitiveness has declined because 
of protection given to the steel industry. Cries of unfair 
competition are unfounded. 
U.S. R~sponse: 
Cries of unfair competition by the U.S. steel industry are 
not at all unfounded. our current steel program is pre·dicated· 
on numerous findings of unfair trade practices (such as 
dumping 1,£lnd injurious subsidies) in the EC and elsewhere. 
In 1981, the EC asked Y.§ to negotiate a bilateral voluntary 
restraint agreement on steel in order to avoid the imposition 
of heavy antidumping and countervailing d~ties in response 
to the filing of several hundred petitions by the U.S. steel 
industry. This agreement was recently renewed. 
. :--· 
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Agriculture 
EC Argument: 
The European Community contends that is is portrayed as 
unfairly protectionist and that this simply is not true, 
particularly in the area of agriculture~ 
U.S. Response: 
. 
·.· 
The European Community's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is 
highly protectionist. Prices for most agricultural crops are 
prescribed by the Commission of the European Community, and 
are supported at levels far,above world market prices •. 
Isolated from normal supply and demand forces, prices within 
the EC have continued to rise despite a downturn in world 
markets. 
To protect domestic prices from foreign influence, the EC has 
establt&hed a system of variable levies, quotas, minimum 
import prices and other protective mechanisms. Using these 
devices, the EC has virtually isolated many of its agricul-
tural commodity sectors from.the effects of world market 
forces. 
The EC is still a major food importer, bringing in $82-billion 
.. ~ 
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worth of agricultural imports during 1983. However, the EC's 
policy of. high farm price supports· in conjunction with wide-
spread import protection and-a massive system of agricultural 
export subsidies under the CAP has caused a dramatic shift 
in the Community's net trading'position for a number of key 
commodities. Putting it another way, ·the EC has been 
stimulating excess production through skyhigh price supports, 
and then shoving the excess on the world market through 
export subsidies. 
o At the start of the 1970's, the EC was a net importer of over 
20 million Metric Tons (MT) of grains annually •. Since 
then, Community exports have increased to such an extent 
that i~ 198-2/83, EC net exports of grains reached 11 million 
MT. 
o The EC has gone from being a net importer of white sugar to 
being the world I s largest exporter. Exports totaled 5. 6 
million MT, on- a raw basis, in 1982/83. EC sugar exports 
have demglished the world market for that product with prices 
falling to as low as .OJ/lb. in 1985. This has had a 
devastating effect on other sugar exporters, most of whom 
are LDCs. 
o Prior to 1973/74, the EC was a net importer of beef and veal. 
In recent years, the EC has been the world's largest exporter 
.. . . 
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of these products, thanks to export subsidies that have been 
nearly as g~eat as the value of the underlying products 
themselves. 
o In poultry, the EC has moved from being the world's largest 
importer i~ the mid-l960's to currently being the world's 
largest exporter. 
These shifts, due almost entirely to EC intervention in its 
agricultural sector, have had a major impact on the volume and 
pattern of world agricultural trade and have significantly 
reduced marketing opportunities within the EC and in third 
country markets for efficient agricultural producing countries 
fike the u~.$~\ 
-.... - ... 
The primary remaining markets for U.S. agricultural products 
within the EC are for soybeans and certain other livestock 
feed ingredients. The only reason we have been able to 
maintain these_markets is that the U.S. has a zero duty GATT 
binding obtained in a previous round of _trade negotiations. 
~----
On several occasions, the EC has threatened to introduce 
measures which would impair that concession. After threat 
of U.S. retaliation, the EC has thus far withdrawn its 
proposals. 
EC Argument: 
: ··•. 
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"It is estimated th~t the· EC price support level this year 
will be approximately $19 billion, compared with a u.s. figure 
of $21 billion." 
U.S. Response: 
EC statements that the U.S. spends as much or more than the 
EC on agriculture are false. With the exception of 1983 
(when the U. s. took 83 million acres of land out of production 
in an effort to shore us global market prices) U.S. budget 
expenditures for farm supports have been lower than those of 
the EC .for every year from 1978 to 1984. Estimates for 1985 
also put U~i· expenditures lower than those of the EC. 
·- :-.,. 
Furthermore, the EC numbers include only eArpenditures by the 
Commission: they exclude farm supports provided by individual 
countries, which typically total to about the same amount 
those provided by the Commission. 
Another important difference lies in how those sums are ,_ 
spent. We have been using nearly· all our support money in a 
non-confrontational way - through income payments to farmers, 
storage payments on excess production, and diversion payments 
to idle land. The EC, on the other hand, has made almost no 
effort until recently to reduce production, and has moved 
its surpluses onto the world market in a highly confronta-
.... 
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tional way, undercutting the prices of. our producers and 
those of other exporting nations. 
EC Argument: 
"The EC does subsidize exports but •••• it has· always done so 
in full conformity with GATT 11 • 
U.S. Response: 
GATT rules on agricultural export subsidies are unclear. A 
GATT panel established to consider a U.S. complaint against 
the Community's export subsidies for wheat flour could not 
make a definitive finding because of difficulty in interpre-
ting the rules. 
In the case of pasta, a GATT panel agreed with the U.S. view 
that EC subsidies on pasta violate the Collllnunity• s obligations 
under the GATT Subsi-dies Code, but the EC has blocked 
adoption of the panel report. 
~--
The EC's export subsidy system on sugar was found in 1979 to 
threaten serious prejudice to the interests of Australia and 
Brazil. The EC blocked GATT recommendations for change, and 
EC export subsidies have continued to cause great damage to 
other, mostly developing countries. 
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~ote From the United States 
' 4 December 1986 
An Overview of the Tariff Impact on 
Contracting Parties Trade of Spanish and Portuguese 
Accession to the EuroRean Community 
The attached tables present a summary of the impact of the 
introduction of the European Community tariff schedule will 
have on Spain's and Portugal's trade with GATT contracti.ng 
parties other than the members of the EClO. In the first. 
table, the impact is measured in terms of the amount of trade 
covered by changes in tariffs and variable levies. In the 
second table, actual duties foregone or collected for these 
changes in tariffs or variable levies. 
The analysis was carried out using the tariff files supplied by 
the European Community for XXIV:6 negotiations with the United 
States. We used as a basis for analysis the tariffs of the 
EClO rather than the trade weighted average for the EC12. In 
addition, we estimated the ad valorem equivalent of EClO 
variable levies effective in the early Spring 1986. Values in 
these tables are in millions of ECUs and reflect average 
1983/8~ trade volumes. 
The results of table 1 show that about 6.4 billion ECUs of 
third country trade with Spain and Portugal would experience 
tariff decrease~ as a result of the extension of the EC!O 
tariffs to trade with Spain and Portugal. Tariffs and variable 
levies would be increased on 3.2 billion ECUs. In addition, 
the European Community has not indicated how it intends to 
handle the 96 tariff items that are currently blank in the 
tariff so we treated those as adverse to third country · 
interests. These blanks cover about 1.9 billion ECUs of third 
country trade with Spain and Portugal. There are no changes in 
tariffs on 4.2 billion ECUs. The overall impact shows that 
tariffs decre.se on about 6.4 billion ECUs while they increase 
or are of otherwise adversely impacted on 5.1 billion ECUs. 
Table 2 shows the impact on a duties collected basis. In this 
case the results are remarkably different from the pr~vious 
table. Duties foregone are about 675 million ECUs. Increased 
duties collected however are almost double that amount, 1,328 
million ECUs. This marked adverse impact on third country 
trade is further amplified when the impact of the 96 blanks, 
1,859 million ECUs, are added into this. In this case, the 
disadvantages to third countries on a duties collected basis is 
nearly 5 times as great as the advantages for third countries 
trading with Spain and Portugal. 
Tables 3 and 4 provide the same information as tables 1 and 2, 
but from the point of view of U.S. trade with Spain and 
Portugal. 
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Global 
Spain 
f TABLE 1 
An Overview of the Effect of 
Extending the Tariff System of the 
EC-10 to GATT 
Contracting Parties Trade with 
Spain and Portugal: 
( 1 9 8 3 / 8 4 Tr a.de ) 
trade with 
and Portugal Total Imports of 
where tariffs are Spain and Portugal 
decreasin9 (millions of ECUs) 
a. Bound 3439.2 
b. New Bindings 2963.l 
c. Unbindings 85.1 
d. Remaining unbound 3.9 
6491.3 
Global trade with 
Spain and Portugal 
where tariffs are 
increasin9 
a. Bound , ,~·, ·.;. -:·?r.,:. 132.2 
. . ,~· . . .. 
b. New Bindings 1730.2 
c. Unbindings 723.8 
d. Remaining unbound 595. 7 
3181.9 
Global trade with 
Spain and Portugal 
where tariffs remain 
the same 
a. Bound 396.5 
b. New B.indings 3792.0 
c. Unbindings 0.6 
d. Remaining unbound 1.2 
4190.3 
\. 
96 Blanks 1858.7 
' •.: 
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TABLE 2 
An Overview of the Effect of 
Extending the Tariff System of the 
EC~lo to GATT 
Contracting Parties Trade with 
Spain and Portugal: 
(1983/84 Trade) 
Global trade with 
Spain and Portugal Duties Collected 
where tariffs are or Foregone 
decreasiJ"!g (millions of ECUs) 
a. Bound -415.6 
b. New Bindings -258.6 
c. Unbindings -o. 7 
d. Remaining unbound o.o 
c-674.9 
Global trade with 
Spain and Portugal 
where tariffs are 
increasin9 
a.:. Bound 7.4 
b. New .. Bindings 111.3 
c. Unbindings· 623.2 
d. Remaining unbound 586.4 
1328.3 
Global trade with 
Spain and Portugal 
where tariffs remain 
the same 
a. Bound o.o 
b. New Bindings o.o 
c. Unbin.aings o.o 
d. Remaining unbound o.o 
o.o 
96 Blanks (Trade Coverage) 1858.7 
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TABLE 3 
An Overview of the Effect of 
Extending the Tariff System of the 
EC-10 to the United States 
Trade with Spain and Portugal: 
(1983/84 Trade) 
U.S. trade with 
Spain and Portugal 
where tariffs are 
decreasing 
a. Bound 
b. New Bindings 
c. Unbindings 
d. Remaining unbound 
U.S. trade with 
Spain and Portugal 
where tariffs are 
increasing 
a. Bound 
b. New Bindings 
c. Unbindings 
d. Remaining unbound 
U.S. trade with 
Spain and Portugal 
where tariffs remain 
the same 
a. Bound 
b. New Bindings 
c. Unbind'fngs 
d. Remaining unbound 
96 Blanks 
~l:)E"GO~ ~ t 1@ & Ccllcct:t d 
or Fe!'cgefte 
(~illions of ECUs) 
1138.6 
595.l 
.2 
.6 
1734.5 
47.0 
497.6 
450.8 
547.6 
1543.0 
215.3 
273.8 
0.0 
0.1 
489.2 
1113.7 · 
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3) 
4) 
. · TABLE 4 
. An Overview of the Effect of 
Extending·the Tariff System of the 
EC-10 to the United States 
Trade with Spain and Portugal: 
(1983/84 Trade) 
U.S. trade with 
Spain and Portugal 
where tariffs are 
decreasing 
a. Bound 
b. New Bindings 
c. Unbindings 
d. Remaining unbound 
U.S. trade with 
Spain and Portugal 
where tariffs are 
increasin9 
a. Bound 
b .. :. New _Bindi'ng.s 
c. Unbinding~· 
d. Remaining unbound 
U.S. trade with 
Spain and Portugal 
where tariffs remain 
the same 
a. Bound 
b. New Bindings 
c. Unbindings 
d. Remaining unbound 
96 Blanks (Trade coverage) 
Duties Collected 
or Foregone 
(millions of ECUs) 
-=-14 7 • 5 
"'"68.3 
~o. o 
0.0 
~21s. 0 
2.1 
0.0 
455.5 
537.9 
995.5 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
o.o 
1113.7 
, 
